| Transportation of High-Level Radioactive Material, i.e. Spent Fuel |
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1: INTRODUCTION:
The transportation of highly radioactive material, including used reactor fuel, causes great concern
among the public as a result of the way it is presented by the news media and in literature from anti-
nuclear power organizations. The threat of harm to health depends on three factors: 1) the
likelihood of a transportation accident which would 2) release radioactivity from the transportation
containers, and 3) the harm to health if radioactivity were released.
The National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies of Science (NAC) published a book-
length report on the transportation of high-level waste (1).
2: Likelihood of an accident
The fire in the Howard Street rail tunnel in Baltimore on July 18, 2001 led to much speculation
about radioactive releases had the train been carrying high-level radioactive waste. This tunnel has
particular significance because it is one of the most outstanding bottlenecks in the entire US rail
transportation system (2). Several organizations issued reports that concluded that this tunnel
constitutes a severe hazard for the transportation of used fuel rods and that similar events at other
locations on the rail system might constitute similar hazards:
Many articles in a similar vein can be found by searching the web for: “Baltimore Tunnel Fire.”
The validity of these claims rests on the likelihood that “...a train carrying atomic waste were to
catch fire.” The NRC mentions two approaches to minimizing the probability of a prolonged fire
involving a train carrying high-level radioactive material: 1) separate such material from cargo
consisting of flammable, explosive, or corrosive materials, i.e. general freight, or 2) test
transportation containers against longer and hotter fires than have been used presently. The report
states that the second approach is currently under way (see below).
The first approach (physical separation) is in fact being practiced, in contradiction to statements
from many anti-nuclear organizations which imply that high-level radioactive material has been,
and will continue to be transported on general purpose freight trains. This is not, and actually
never has been the case as stated in a report from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (4):
In the aftermath of a severe rail accident in England in which 10 tank cars loaded with gasoline
derailed in a tunnel and burned for four days:
the practice of using dedicated trains. Mandatory compliance is entirely possible. The Association
of American Railroads, which is a standards setting organization, made the following statement in
hearings before the Senate Committee on Science, Commerce, and Transportation on September 24,
2008:
The Association of American Railroads has also recommended that the dedicated trains be
composed of rolling stock that is more road worthy than the usual, having electropneumatic brakes
that stop the whole train simultaneously and that also allow electrical detection of malfunctions by
the engineers; their recommended practices for spent fuel and high level waste are for maximum
speed of 50mph (5).
The hazards of rail transportation of used reactor fuel, which are currently voluntarily prevented
from contact with general freight, could be permanently prevented by regulatory or legislative
action. The probability of a rail accident is very low.
3: Likelihood of container leakage
The report, issued in 2003, from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (4) about the fire and its
potential consequences concluded:
Last edited 5/8/09 12:00 AM
The transportation of highly radioactive material, including used reactor fuel, causes great concern
among the public as a result of the way it is presented by the news media and in literature from anti-
nuclear power organizations. The threat of harm to health depends on three factors: 1) the
likelihood of a transportation accident which would 2) release radioactivity from the transportation
containers, and 3) the harm to health if radioactivity were released.
The National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies of Science (NAC) published a book-
length report on the transportation of high-level waste (1).
2: Likelihood of an accident
The fire in the Howard Street rail tunnel in Baltimore on July 18, 2001 led to much speculation
about radioactive releases had the train been carrying high-level radioactive waste. This tunnel has
particular significance because it is one of the most outstanding bottlenecks in the entire US rail
transportation system (2). Several organizations issued reports that concluded that this tunnel
constitutes a severe hazard for the transportation of used fuel rods and that similar events at other
locations on the rail system might constitute similar hazards:
- “If a train carrying atomic waste were to catch fire, the only thing standing between
people and deadly radiation would be the nuclear waste transport casks, which could leak in
a severe accident, releasing radiation. Spent nuclear fuel, even decades after removal from
the reactor, could deliver a lethal dose of radiation in just a few minutes time.” “The big
question is, could high-level atomic waste containers survive such severe accident conditions?
If not, we could be looking at our own Chernobyl catastrophe -- on wheels.”(3)
Many articles in a similar vein can be found by searching the web for: “Baltimore Tunnel Fire.”
The validity of these claims rests on the likelihood that “...a train carrying atomic waste were to
catch fire.” The NRC mentions two approaches to minimizing the probability of a prolonged fire
involving a train carrying high-level radioactive material: 1) separate such material from cargo
consisting of flammable, explosive, or corrosive materials, i.e. general freight, or 2) test
transportation containers against longer and hotter fires than have been used presently. The report
states that the second approach is currently under way (see below).
The first approach (physical separation) is in fact being practiced, in contradiction to statements
from many anti-nuclear organizations which imply that high-level radioactive material has been,
and will continue to be transported on general purpose freight trains. This is not, and actually
never has been the case as stated in a report from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (4):
- “It should be noted that although the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and the U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) do not have regulations requiring dedicated trains
to transport spent nuclear fuel (i.e., trains shipping only spent nuclear fuel), the Association
of American Railroads (AAR) has developed a performance standard for the transportation of
spent nuclear fuel by rail. This performance standard dictates the use of railcars that have
been analyzed and tested to minimize the possibility of derailment. Standard tanker cars
used to ship flammable or hazardous materials would not meet this performance standard.
Therefore, if this performance standard is followed, carriers would not ship hazardous
materials on the same train as commercial spent nuclear fuel. To date, the practice in the
industry has been to make spent fuel rail shipments by dedicated trains, and the industry has
been self-regulating in this respect.”
In the aftermath of a severe rail accident in England in which 10 tank cars loaded with gasoline
derailed in a tunnel and burned for four days:
- “... an operational rule was established that prohibited English trains carrying spent fuel
packages and trains hauling flammable materials from crossing in rail tunnels.(1, p81).
the practice of using dedicated trains. Mandatory compliance is entirely possible. The Association
of American Railroads, which is a standards setting organization, made the following statement in
hearings before the Senate Committee on Science, Commerce, and Transportation on September 24,
2008:
- “The rail industry commends the DOE for recognizing the benefits of dedicated trains, and
commends the U.S. Navy for agreeing to conform with S-2043. However, despite its 2005
policy statement in favor of the use of dedicated trains generally and its statement to the STB
[Surface Transportation Board] that it will use dedicated trains on its own Yucca Mountain
line, DOE has not committed to use dedicated trains for SNF [spent nuclear fuel] shipments on
other rail lines, including shipments to Yucca Mountain. The U.S. Navy has not yet agreed to
use dedicated trains for SNF shipments. Railroads respectfully suggest that policymakers
should strongly encourage the DOE and Navy to do so.”
The Association of American Railroads has also recommended that the dedicated trains be
composed of rolling stock that is more road worthy than the usual, having electropneumatic brakes
that stop the whole train simultaneously and that also allow electrical detection of malfunctions by
the engineers; their recommended practices for spent fuel and high level waste are for maximum
speed of 50mph (5).
The hazards of rail transportation of used reactor fuel, which are currently voluntarily prevented
from contact with general freight, could be permanently prevented by regulatory or legislative
action. The probability of a rail accident is very low.
3: Likelihood of container leakage
The report, issued in 2003, from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (4) about the fire and its
potential consequences concluded:
- “that for a 10 CFR Part 71 approved spent fuel transportation cask subjected to the
Howard Street tunnel fire, no release of radioactive materials would have resulted from this
postulated event, and the health and safety of the public would have been maintained.”
- “The important question to be answered by testing is not whether a package could be
made to fail; as noted previously, it would certainly be possible to design tests that would
accomplish this goal. Rather, the question that needs to be answered is whether there are
credible accident conditions that would result in releases of radioactivity to the environment
that would endanger emergency responders or the general public. It is clear from the
modeling and full-scale tests described in this chapter that transportation packages are
extremely rugged. The committee judges that packages designed, fabricated, used, and
maintained under current regulatory standards are very unlikely to encounter loading
conditions under real-world conditions, with the possible exception of very long duration
fires, that would lead to releases in excess of regulatory limits. The committee recognizes,
however, that even minor releases from package containment might have important social
implications.” (1, p.106)
- “The committee strongly endorses the use of full-scale testing to determine how packages
will perform under both regulatory and credible extraregulatory conditions. Package testing
in the United States and many other countries is carried out using good engineering practices
that combine state-of-the-art structural analyses and physical tests to demonstrate
containment effectiveness. Full-scale testing is a very effective tool both for guiding and
validating analytical engineering models of package performance and for demonstrating the
compliance of package designs with performance requirements. However, deliberate full-scale
testing of packages to destruction through the application of forces that substantially exceed
credible accident conditions would be marginally informative and is not justified given the
considerable costs for package acquisitions that such testing would require.” (1, p.107)
Last edited 5/8/09 12:00 AM
CONTENTS OF THIS PAGE:
1: INTRODUCTION
2: LIKELIHOOD OF AN ACCIDENT
3: LIKELIHOOD OF CONTAINER LEAKAGE
1: INTRODUCTION
2: LIKELIHOOD OF AN ACCIDENT
3: LIKELIHOOD OF CONTAINER LEAKAGE
NAVIGATION BAR: